In this paper, we study the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) problem under the (distributed) non-interactive local differential privacy model. For the low dimensional case (i.e., ≪ ), we show the optimal rate of Θ( 2 ) (omitting the eigenvalue terms) for the private minimax risk of the -dimensional PCA using the squared subspace distance as the measurement, where is the sample size and is the privacy parameter. For the high dimensional (i.e., ≫ ) row sparse case, we first give a lower bound of Ω( log 2 ) on the private minimax risk, where is the underlying sparsity parameter. Then we provide an efficient algorithm to achieve the upper bound of ( 2 log 2 ). Experiments on both synthetic and real world datasets confirm our theoretical guarantees.
Introduction
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a fundamental technique for dimension reduction in statistics, machine learning, and signal processing. As of today, it remains as one of the most commonly used tools in applications, especially in social sciences [2] , financial econometrics [3] , medicine [4] , and genomics [5] .
With the rapid development of information technologies, big data now ubiquitously exist in our daily life, which need to be analyzed (or learned) statistically by methods like regression and PCA. However, due to the presence of sensitive data (especially those in social science, biomedicine and genomics) and their distributed nature, such data are extremely difficult to aggregate and learn from. Consider a case where health records are scattered across multiple hospitals (or even countries), it is challenging to process the whole dataset in a central server due to privacy and ownership concerns. A better solution is to use some differentially private mechanisms to conduct the aggregation ✩ A preliminary version [1] appeared in Proceedings of The 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2019). and learning tasks. Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006b ) is a commonlyaccepted criterion that provides provable protection against identification and is resilient to arbitrary auxiliary information that might be available to attackers.
Currently, there are mainly two user models available for differential privacy: the central model and the local one. In the central model, data are managed by a trusted central entity which is responsible for collecting them and for deciding which differentially private data analysis to perform and to release. A classical application of this model is the one of collecting census data. In the local model instead, each individual manages his/her proper data and discloses them to a server through some differentially private mechanisms. The server collects the (now private) data of each individual and combines them into a resulting data analysis. A classical example of this model is the one aiming at collecting statistics from user devices like in the case of Google's Chrome browser [6] , and Apple's iOS-10 [7] .
In the local model, two basic types of protocols are often used: interactive and noninteractive. [8] have recently investigated the power of non-interactive differentially private protocols. This type of protocols is more natural for the classical use cases of the local model: both projects from Google and Apple use the non-interactive model. Moreover, implementing efficient interactive protocols in such applications is more difficult due to the latency of the network. Despite being used in industry, the local model has been much less studied than the central one. Part of the reason for this is that there are intrinsic limitations in what one can do in the local model. As a consequence, many basic questions, that are well studied in the central model, have not been completely understood in the local model, yet.
In this paper, we study PCA under the non-interactive local differential privacy model and aim to answer the following main question.
What are the limitations and the (near) optimal algorithms of PCA under the non-interactive local differential privacy model?
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1. We first study the -subspace PCA problem in the low dimensional setting and show that the minimax risk (measured by the squared subspace distance) under non-interactive local differential privacy (LDP) is lower bounded by Ω( 1 +1 ( − +1 ) 2 2 ), where is the dimensionality of the data and is the number of data records, 1 , and +1 is the 1st, -th and ( + 1)-th eigenvalue of the population covariance matrix Σ, respectively. Moreover, we prove that the term Ω( 2 ) is optimal by showing that there is an ( , )-LDP whose upper bound is
2. An undesirable issue of the above result is that the error bound could be too large in high dimensions (i.e., ≫ ). In such scenarios, a natural approach is to impose some additional structural constraints on the leading eigenvectors. A commonly used constraint is to assume that the leading eigenvectors are row sparse, which is refereed as sparse PCA in the literature and has been studied intensively in recent years [9, 10, 11] . Thus, for the high dimensional case, we consider the sparse PCA under the non-interactive local model and show that the private minimax risk (measured by the squared subspace distance) is lower
, where is the sparsity parameter of the underlying subspace. We also give an algorithm to achieve a near optimal upper bound of !
. With additional assumptions on the correlation of the population covariance matrix, we further show that our private estimator is sparsistency, i.e. it recovers the support of the underlying parameter.
3. Finally, we provide an experimental study for our proposed algorithms on both synthetic and real world datasets, and show that the experimental results support our theoretical analysis.
Related Work
There is a vast number of papers studying PCA under differential privacy, starting from the SULQ framework [12] , [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] . We compare only those private PCA results in distributed settings.
For the low dimensional case, Balcan et al. [18] studied the private PCA problem under the interactive local differential privacy model and introduced an approach based on the noisy power method. They showed an upper bound which is suitable for general settings, while ours is mainly for statistical settings. It is worth pointing out that the output in [18] is only an ( )-dimensional subspace, instead of an exact -dimensional subspace; thus their result is incomparable with ours. Moreover, we provide, in this paper, a lower bound on the non-interactive private minimax risk.
For the private high dimensional sparse PCA, the work most closely related to ours is the one by Ge et al. [17] . The authors in this paper proposed a noisy iterative hard thresholding power method, which is an interactive LDP algorithm and proved an upper bound of !
for their method, where is a parameter related to . Specifically, they showed that there exists some 'Privacy Free Region'. However, several things need to be pointed out. Firstly, our method is for general ∈ (0, 1] and non-interactive settings, while Ge et al. considered the interactive setting with more restricted . Secondly, the assumptions in our paper are less strict than the ones in [17] . Finally, we provide a lower bound on the private minimax risk.
The optimal procedure in our paper is based on perturbing the covariance by Gaussian matrices, which has been studied in [13] . However, there are some major differences; firstly, we show the optimality of our algorithm under the non-interactive local model using subspace distance as the measurement, while [13] showed the optimality under the ( , ) central model using variance as the measurement. It is notable that in [13] the authors also provided an upper bound on the subspace distance. However, the lower bound is still unknown. Secondly, while the optimal algorithm for the low dimensional case is quite similar, we extend it to the high dimensional case. The optimal procedure in the high dimensional sparse case is quite different from that in [13] . Thirdly, in this paper,since we focus the statistical setting while [13] considered the general setting, the upper bound results are incomparable.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the definitions that will be used throughout the paper; more can be found in [19] .
Classical Minimax Risk
Since all of our lower bounds are in the form of private minimax risk, we first introduce the classical statistical minimax risk before discussing the locally private version.
Let  be a class of distributions over a data universe . For each distribution ∈ , there is a deterministic function ( ) ∈ Θ, where Θ is the parameter space. Let ∶ Θ × Θ ∶↦ ℝ + be a semi-metric function on the space Θ and Φ ∶ ℝ + ↦ ℝ + be a non-decreasing function with Φ(0) = 0 (in this paper, we assume that is the subspace distance and Φ( ) = 2 unless specified otherwise).
We further assume that { } =1 are i.i.d observations drawn according to some distribution ∈ , and̂∶  ↦ Θ is some estimator. Then, the minimax risk in metric Φ• is defined by the following saddle point problem:
where the supremum is taken over distributions ∈  and the infimum over all esti-matorŝ.
Local Differential Privacy and Private Minimax Risk
Since we consider the non-interactive local model in this paper, we will follow the definitions in [20] .
We assume that { } =1 are the private observations transformed from { } =1 through some privacy mechanisms. When depends only on , the mechanism is called non-interactive and in this case we have a simpler form for the conditional distributions ( | = ). We now define local differential privacy by restricting the conditional distribution. Definition 1 ([20] ). For a given privacy parameter , > 0, we say that the random variable is an ( , ) non-interactively locally differentially private (LDP) view of if for any , % ∈  and for all the events we have
When = 0, we call it non-interactively LDP view. We say that the privacy mechanism
For a given privacy parameter > 0, let  be the set of conditional distributions that have the -LDP property. For a given set of samples { } =1 , let { } =1 be the set of observations produced by any distribution ∈  . Then, our estimator will be based on { } =1 , that is,̂( 1 , ⋯ , ). This yields a modified version of the minimax risk:
From the above definition, it is natural to seek the mechanism ∈  that has the smallest value for the minimax risk. This allows us to define functions that characterize the optimal rate of estimation in terms of privacy parameter . Definition 2. Given a family of distributions () and a privacy parameter > 0, the non-interactive private minimax risk in the metric Φ• is:
where  is the set of all non-interactively locally differentially private mechanisms.
Locally Private -dimensional PCA
Let ∈ ℝ a random vector with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ. -dimensional PCA is to find a dimensional subspace that optimizes the following problem:
where , is the Grassmann manifold of -dimensional subspaces of ℝ , and Π  is the projection of . There always exists at least one solution; consider Σ = ∑ =1 , where 1 ≥ 2 ≥ ⋯ , ≥ 0 are the eigenvalues of Σ and 1 , 2 , ⋯ , ∈ ℝ are the corresponding eigenvectors. If ≥ +1 , then the -dimensional principal subspace of Σ, i.e. the subspace  spanned by 1 , ⋯ , solves the above optimization problem, where the orthogonal projector of  is given by
is the set of all × orthogonal matrices. For simplicity we denote  = col( ), where col( ) denotes the subspace spanned by the columns vectors of .
PCA under the non-interactive local model. In practice, Σ is unknown, and the only thing that we have is the set of observation data records { 1 , ⋯ , }, which are i.i.d sampled from . Thus, the problem of (non-interactively) locally differentially private PCA is to find a -dimensional subspace  priv which is close to , where the algorithm that outputs  priv must be (non-interactively) locally differentially private.
After obtaining a private estimator  priv , there are multiple ways to measure the success, such as variance guarantee [13] , low rank approximation error [21] , etc. In this paper, we will use the subspace distance as the measurement [13, 17] .
Subspace distance. Let  and  % be two -dimensional subspaces in ℝ . Also denote by and , respectively, the orthogonal matrix corresponds to  and  % . That is, = and = for some orthogonal matrices ∈ , and ∈ , . Then, the squared subspace distance between  and  % is defined by the following [22] :
where ‖⋅‖ is the Frobenious norm. For simplicity, we will overload notation and write sin Θ(,  % ) = sin Θ( , ).
Low Dimensional Case
In this section, we focus on the general case and always assume ≥ . We first derive a lower bound of the non-interactive private minimax risk using the squared subspace distance as the measurement. By the definition of the -private minimax risk, it is important to select an appropriate class of distributions.
Class of Distributions
1. We assume that the random vector X is sub-Gaussian, that is = Σ 1 2 , where ∈ ℝ is some random vector satisfying equations = 0, Var( ) = and its sub-
which means that all the one-dimensional marginals of have sub-Gaussian tails. We need to note that this assumption on is commonly used in many papers on PCA in statistical settings, such as [9, 17] .
2. In the study of private PCA, it is always assumed that the 2 norm of each is bounded by 1, as in [13] [17] . For convenience, we relax this assumption in the following way; for the random vector ∈ ℝ , we assume that ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1 with a probability at least 1 − −Ω( ) .
3. Next, we give assumptions on the population covariance matrix Σ. Firstly, we assume that for the target -dimensional subspace, − +1 > 0 so that the principal subspace is well defined. Next, we define the effective noise variance 2 , which is proposed in [9] and [10]:
For a given constant 2 > 0, we assume that 2 ≤ 2 .
We denote the collection of distributions which satisfy the previous conditions 1), 2) and 3) as ( , 2 )
Main Results
The next theorem shows a lower bound of non-interactive private minimax risk under squared subspace distance.
, then the non-interactive private minimax risk in the metric of squared subspace distance satisfies:
Remark 1. We note that for the non-private case, the minimax risk is lower bounded
. Thus, in this case, the impact of the local differential privacy is to change the number of efficient sample from to 2 . However, the collection of the considered distributions needs another assumption which says that ‖ ‖ 2 is bounded by 1 with high probability. This is not necessary in the non-private case [10] , but needed in ours for showing the upper bound. We also note that although Theorem 1 holds only for = Θ( ), while in practice always be a constant. As we can see from Section 7, the lower bound holds for all if we relax the condition 2) in our collection of distributions ( 2 , ). It is the same for the high dimensional sparse case.
Finally, note that in the central differential privacy model, [13] showed that the
) for ( , )-differential privacy. However, this lower bound is measured by the variance of = ( 1 , 2 , ⋯ , ) ∈ ℝ × , not the squared subspace distance used in this paper. Although [13] gave an upper bound of (
in the general setting using the squared subspace distance as measurement, it is still unknown whether the bound is optimal. Also, their lower bound omits the parameters related to the eigenvalues. For the differential privacy in the central model, [14] showed that the lower bound is Ω(
in the special case of = 1. However, it is still unknown for the general case of . Thus, from the above discussion, we can see that the lower bound of non-interactively locally differentially private PCA is similar to the ( , ) differentially private PCA in the central model.
One of the main questions is whether the lower bound in Theorem 1 is tight. In the following, we show that the term Ω( 2 ) is tight. By our definition of the parameter space, we know that for any ∼ ∈ ( 2 , ), ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1 with high probability. Thus, we always assume that the event of each ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1 holds. Note that this assumption also appears in [17, 13, 18] . The idea is the same as in [13] , where each perturbs its covariance and aggregates the noisy version of covariance, see Algorithm 1 for details. Theorem 2. For any , > 0, Algorithm 1 is ( , ) (non-interactively) locally differentially private. Furthermore, with probability at least 1 − − 1 − 1 2 , the output satisfies:
where 1 , 2 are some universal constants.
In Theorem 7 of [13] , the authors provided a similar upper bound for the ( , )differential privacy in the central model. However, they need to assume that the eigenvalues satisfy the condition 2 − 2 +1 = ( √ ), which is not needed in our Theorem 2 where we use some recent result on Davis-Khan theorem (see Section 7 for details).
From the analysis, we can see that, to ensure non-interactive LDP, here we should add a randomized matrix to the covariance matrix, and this will cause an additional factor of ( 1 2 ) in the error compared with the non-private case.
Algorithm 1 Local Gaussian Mechanism
: data records { } =1 ∼ for ∈ ( 2 , ), and for ∈ [ ], ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1. , are the privacy parameters.
1: for Each ∈ [ ] do 2: Denotẽ̃= + , where ∈ ℝ × is a symmetric matrix where the upper triangle ( including the diagonal) is i.i.d samples from  (0, 2 1 ); here
, and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart. 3: end for 4: Computẽ= 1 ∑ =1̃̃.
5:
Output col(̃) wherẽ∈ ℝ × is the principal -subspace of̃.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we can see that there is still a gap of ( 1
+1
) between the lower and upper bounds. We leave it as an open problem to determine whether these bounds are tight or not.
High Dimensional Sparse Case
From Theorem 1, we can see that for the high dimensional case, i.e. ≫ , the bound in (2) becomes trivial. Thus, to avoid this issue, we need some additional assumption on the parameter space. One of the commonly used assumption is sparsity. There are many definitions of sparsity on PCA and we use the row sparsity in this paper, which has also been studied in [9, 10, 17] .
We first define the ( , )-norm of a × matrix as the usual norm of the vector of row-wise norms of :
where * denotes the -th row of . Note that ‖ ⋅ ‖ 2,0 is coordinate independent, i.e. ‖ ‖ 2,0 = ‖ ‖ 2,0 for any orthogonal matrix ∈ ℝ × . We define the row sparse space as follows. We define our parameter space, ( , , 2 ), to be the same as in the previous section with an additional condition that  ∈  0 ( ), where  is the -dimensional principal subspace of covariance matrix Σ.
Below, we will first derive a lower bound of the non-interactive locally differentially private PCA in the high dimensional sparse case. If the privacy parameter ∈ (0, 1 2 
. Then for all ∈ [ ] satisfying the condition of 2 ≤ − ≤ − and 4 ≤ ≤ 3 4 , the non-interactive private minimax risk in the metric of squared subspace distance satisfies the following
Note that in the non-private case, the optimal minimax risk is Θ ! 2 ( +log ) " . Thus, same as in the low dimensional case, the impact of the privacy constraint is to change the efficient samples from to 2 .
Next, we consider the upper bound. In the non-private case, the optimal procedure is to solve the following NP-hard optimization problem [9] :
where is the empirical covariance matrix. Our upper bound is based on (4). However, instead of solving (4) on the perturbed version of the empirical covariance matrix, we perturb the covariance matrix and solve the following optimization problem on the convex hull of the constraints in (4), that is:
subject to ∈  ∶= { ∶ 0 ⪯ ⪯ and Tr( ) = },
where ⟨ , ⟩ = Tr( ). Note that the constraints in (5) , which is called Fantope [23] [11] , is the convex hull of the constrains in (4) . Also, since the constraints in (5) only guarantees that the rank of the output is ≥ , the output̂needs not to be a matrix with exact rank of . Thus, in order to obtain a proper -dimensional subspace, we just output the -PCA of̂. , then with probability at least 1 − 2 2 − 1 , the following holds
where is a universal constant.
From the analysis, we can see that, to ensure non-interactive LDP, here we still need to add a randomized matrix to the covariance matrix, which is similar as in the low dimensional case. And this will cause an additional factor of ( 1 2 ) in the error compared with the non-private case in [11] .
Algorithm 2 Local Gaussian Mechanism-High Dimension
: data records { } =1 ∼ for ∈  ( , 2 , ) , and for ∈ [ ], ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1. , are privacy parameters. > is a constant.
1: for Each ∈ [ ] do 2: Denotẽ̃= + , where ∈ ℝ × is a symmetric matrix where the upper triangle, including the diagonal, is i.i.d samples from  (0, 2 ); here 2 = 2 ln(1.25∕ ) 2 , and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart. 3: end for 4: Computẽ= 1 ∑ =1̃̃.
5:
Get the optimal solution̂in (5) or do as the followings 6: Setting (0) = 0, (0) = 0 7: for = 1, 2, ⋯ do 8:
where  is the entry-wise soft thresholding operator defined as  ∕ ( ) = sign( ) max(% % − ∕ , 0).
10:
( +1) = ( ) + ( +1) − ( +1)
11:
Return ( ) 12: end for 13 : Let k-dimensional principal component of̂or ( ) bẽ, output = col(̃).
Since the optimization problem (5) is convex, we can follow the approach in [11] to solve it by using ADMM method (see Algorithm 2 for the details).
Comparing with the lower bound of the private minimax risk in Theorem 3, we can see that the bound in Theorem 4 is roughly larger than the optimal rate by a factor of ( 1
+1
). This means that the upper bound is only near optimal [11] . A remaining open problem is to determine whether it is possible to get a tighter upper bound that does not contain the term of in the gap.
Support recovery under local differential privacy. In the high dimensional sparse case, to ensure that an estimator is consistent, we need to demonstrate that ( , * ) → 0 as → ∞ and supp( ) = supp( * ). By the definition of row sparsity (3), we will show that the solution of (5) can recover the support under some reasonable assumptions. For a matrxi ∈ ℝ × , we let supp( ) = supp((‖ 1 * ‖ 2 , ‖ 2 * ‖ 2 , ⋯ , ‖ * ‖ 2 )) = supp(diag( )). Below we assume that the underlying covariance matrix Σ is limited correlated, i.e., satisfies the limited correlation condition (LCC). LCC is first proposed by [24] , which is an extension of the Irrepresentable Condition in [25] . Let = supp( ), and Σ be the following block representation:
where Σ 1 2 denotes the % 1 %×% 2 % submatrix of Σ consisting of rows in 1 and columns in 2 .
Definition 4 (LCC). A symmetric matrix Σ satisfies the limited correlation condition
Under the LCC assumption, we now show that our private estimator can recover the support with high probability by a modified argument for the Theorem in [11] . ( , , , 1 , , +1 , , , ) satisfy the following condition
Theorem 5. Under the same assumption in Theorem 4, if the covariance matrix is further assumed to satisfy the LCC condition with (Definition 4) and parameters
then by setting = ( √ log 1∕ √ log ), with probability at least 1 − 2 2 − 1 , the solution to the optimization problem (5) is unique and satisfies supp(diag(̂)) ⊆ . Moreover, if either
holds, then supp(diag(̂)) = .
Experiments
In this section we conduct numerical experiments on both synthetic and real world datasets to validate our theoretical results on utility and privacy tradeoff.
Low dimensional case
Experimental settings. For synthetic datasets, we generate the data samples { } =1 independently from a multivariate Gaussian distribution  (0, Σ), where Σ = 5 ( +1)) +
ability. We choose = 10 5 , = 40, = {5, 10, 15, 20}, = 0.5, = 10 −4 , and = 1. For real world datasets, we run Algorithm 1 on Covertype and Buzz datasets [26] with normalized rows for each dataset. The error is measured by the subspace distance ‖̂̂− ‖ . For each experiment, we repeat 20 times and take the average as the final result. Figure 1 and 2 are the results for the real world datasets while Figure 3 is for synthetic datasets. Figures indicate that 1) the error deceases as the sample size increases or increases (i.e., becomes less private); 2) the error increases as the dimensionality increases or the dimensionality of the target subspace increases. All these support our theoretical analysis in Theorem 2. 
High dimensional case
Experimental settings. For the high dimensional case, we consider the same distributions as in the low dimensional case and generate the target subspace in the following way. For a given sparsity parameter , we first generate a random orthogonal matrix ∈ ℝ × , then pad it with rows of zeros, and finally randomly permute the matrix. We set = 10, = 2000, = 400, = {15, 20, 40, 80} and = 1.
Besides the synthetic datasets, we also test our algorithm on some real world datasets in [26] and [27] . We first orthogonalize each row of the datasets to 1 as the preprocessing, then run the method in [28] 50 times, and select the one with the largest variance as the optimal solution. Figure 3 shows the results on the synthetic data. We can see that 1) as the term of increases ( decreases), the error increases accordingly; 2) the error slightly increases when the dimensionality increases, which is due to the fact that the upper bound in Theorem 4 depends only logarithmically on (i.e., log ); 3) the error decreases when increases. Table 1 and 2 show the results of the error with different sparsity and privacy, respectively. We can see that these results are consistent with our theoretical analysis in Theorem 4. Table 2 : Results with different privacy levels for LDP-High dimensional PCA on real world datasets. For all the datasets, the target dimensions is set to be = 10 and = 20. 
Detailed Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the non-interactive case, which is based on the following lemma. [20] ). Let be randomly and uniformly distributed in . Assume that given = , is sampled independently according to the distribution of , for = 1, ⋯ , . Then, there is a universal constant < 19 such that for any ∈ (0, 23 35 ], we have
Lemma 1 (Corollaries 2 and 4 in
The non-interactive private minimax risk satisfies
Where (⋅; ⋅) is the mutual information.
For the packing set, we have the following lemma:
[ [10] ] Let (Θ, ) be a totally bounded metric space. For any subset ⊂ Θ, denote by  ( , ) the -covering number of , that is, the minimal number of balls of radius whose union contained in . Also denote by ( , ) the -packing number of , that is, the maximal number of points in whose pairwise distance is at least . If there exist 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 1 < ∞ and > 0 such that:
for all 0 < ≤ 0 , then for any 1 ≥ > 0, there exists a packing set
Now, for the Grassmannian manifold , we have the following lemma regarding the metric entropy (due to [29] ).
Lemma 3.
For any ∈ , , identify the subspace span( ) with its projection matrix , and define the metric on , by ( ,
where 0 , 1 are absolute constants.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemmas 3 and 2, we know that there exists a packing set  with log %% ≥ ( − ) log 0 1 with 2 1 ≥ ( , ) ≥ 1 , where and 1 will be specified later. Now we construct the collection of distributions; for each ∈ , we define Σ = 5 ( + 1)
that is, 1 = 2 = ⋯ = = 1 5 and +1 = ⋯ = = 1 5 ( +1) . Then we let denote the distribution  (0, Σ ). Now, we first show that the distribution is contained in our parameter space. For ∼  (0, Σ ), we know that there exists an orthogonal matrix ∈ ℝ × which satisfies ∼  (0, Diag(Σ )), where
− . For the 2 -distribution, we have the following concentration bound:
By Lemma 4, we have the following with probability at least 1−exp(− )−exp(−( − )) ≥ 1 − 2 exp(− 4 ) (by our definition of ), ‖ ‖ 2 2 ≤ 1 5 5 + 1 5 ( +1) 5( − ) ≤ 1. Thus, ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1 with probability at least 1 − exp(−Ω( )), which is contained in the parameter space.
The following lemma shows that the Total Variation distance between and " can be bounded by the subspace distance between and % . Lemma 5. For any pair of , % ∈ , by the KL-distance (⋅%%⋅) of two Gaussian distributions, we have that
Thus, by PinskerâĂŹs inequality that is
we can get
By Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we have
. We have that if 2 1 ≤ 2 min{ , − } (which holds under the assumption of ≥ Ω( 1
).
Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma is based on [31] [32] . . Then there exist constants ≥ 1 and ≥ 0 such that when ≥ , we have the following:
Proof of Theorem 2. Instead of using Davis-Kahan sin −Θ theorem in [33] and Weyl's inequality (which is used in [13] based on the assumption that − +1 = ( √ )), we will use a generalized version of Davis-Kahan Theorem [34] .
Lemma 7 (Generalized Davis-Kahan Theorem). Let Σ,Σ ∈ ℝ × be two symmetric matrices, with eigenvalues 1 ≥ ⋯ , and̂1 ≥ ⋯ ≥̂, respectively. Fix 1 ≤ ≤ ≤ and assume that min
By taking = 1, = in Lemma 7, we have
Let denote the non-noise covariance matrix = 1 ∑ =1 . Then
For the fist term, we have ‖̃− ‖ 2 = ‖ ‖ 2 , where is a symmetric matrix whose upper triangle, including the diagonal, is i.i.d sample from  (0, 2 ) with 2 = 
). Combining the above results, we get the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
The construction of the class of distributions follows the idea presented in [9] . For self-completeness, we rephrase below some important lemmas. See [9] for the proofs.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we consider the same class of distribution as in (7) . Thus, the key step is to find a packing set in , . The next lemma provides a general method for constructing such local packing sets. 
By Lemmas 1 and 8, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let ∈ [0, 1], ∈ (0, 23 35 ] and { 1 , ⋯ , } ⊂ − , for some 1 ≤ ≤ ≤ . For each ∈ [ ], let be the distribution of  (0, Σ ( ) ), where Σ ( ) is in (7) . If min
then the non-interactive private minimax risk in the metric of squared subspace distantce satisfies:
].
For variable selection, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 10 (Hypercube construction [36] ). Let be an integer satisfying ≤ and ∈ [1, ]. There exists a subset { 1 , ⋯ , } ⊂ ,1 satisfying the following properties:
We choose = 1 and = 1 2 in Lemma 9 and = − in Lemma 10. Then, if
The following lemma shows packing sets in the Grassman manifold. Lemma 11 ([37] ). Let and be integers satisfying 1 ≤ ≤ − and > 0. There exists a subset { 1 , ⋯ , } ⊂ , satisfying the following properties:
for all ≠ and 2. log ≥ ( − ) log( 2 ), where 2 > 0 is an absolute constant.
We set = − , in Lemma 11 and = in Lemma 9. For each ∈ − , in Lemma 11, we can turn it into a matrix in − , by padding additional rows with zero entries. Thus, if taking = (
). Putting everything together, we have
Proof of Theorem 4
Our proof follows the framework in [11] . First, we show that the subspace distance is close to ‖̂− ‖ 2 , where is the -dimensional principal subspace of Σ.
Lemma 12.
[ [9] ] Let , be symmetric matrices and , , , be their -dimensional principal component subspace, respectively. Let , = max{ ( )− +1 ( ), ( )− +1 ( )}. Then, we have
By Lemma 12, we get the following lemma.
Thus, we have the following bound for ‖̂− ‖ .
Lemma 14 ([11] ). Let be a symmetric matrix and be its projection onto the subspace spanned by the eignevectors of corresponding to its -largest eigenvalues
for all satisfying 0 ⪯ ⪯ and Tr( ) = .
Lemma 15. In the optimization problem (5) , if ≥ ‖̃− Σ‖ ∞,∞ , then
where ‖ ‖ ∞,∞ = max , % , % for any matrix ∈ ℝ × .
Proof of Theorem 4. Sincêand are all feasible for the optimization problem (5), we have 0 ≤ ⟨̃,̂− ⟩ − (‖̂‖ 1,1 − ‖ ‖ 1,1 ).
In Lemma 14, taking = Σ (then = ) and =̂, we get
Thus, we have
Let be the subset of indices of the non-zero entries of . We have = (
) . Thus, ‖̂− ‖ 1,1 − ‖̂‖ 1,1 + ‖ ‖ 1,1 ≤ 2‖(̂− ) ‖ 1,1 .
Also, we have ‖(̂− ) ‖ 1,1 ≤ ‖̂− ‖ . This gives us the proof.
By Lemma 15, we know that our goal is to bound the term of ‖̃− Σ‖ ∞,∞ . Note that by the definition of̃, we havẽ= + , where is a symmetric Gaussian matrix with covariance 2 = 2 log 1.25∕ 2 . Thus, we have
For the first term, we have the following lemma, since is assumed to be sub-Gaussian. 
For the second term ‖ ‖ ∞,∞ , we have, with probability at least 1 − 2 2 exp(− 2 2 ), ‖ ‖ ∞,∞ ≤ . Thus in total, with probability at least 1 − 2 2 − 1 we have ‖̃− Σ‖ ∞,∞ ≤ ( 1 √ log √ ). Combining thi s with Lemma 15, we get the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is based on Theorem 1 in [24] , which considers the case of general symmetric matrix . = arg max < , > − ‖ ‖ 1,1 (9) subject to ∈  ∶= { ∶ 0 ⪯ ⪯ and Tr( ) = }.
Lemma 17 ([24] ). If the parameter in (9) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we comprehensively study -dimensional PCA in the non-interactive local differential privacy model. We first study the low dimensional case and show that Θ( 2 ) is optimal under the measurement of squared space distance by modifying the Gaussian perturbation method. Moreover, we study the high dimensional sparse case and provide a near optimal upper bound. There are still many open problems. For example, in this paper, all of the minimax lower bounds are for non-interactive local model and cannot extended to the interactive local model directly. Thus, it is still unknown what are the minimax lower bounds for the problem in the interactive LDP model under low dimensional and high dimensional setting.
